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journal article
Gordon Tullock's Critique of the Common LawThe Independent Review
Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 2018)
, pp. 209-226 (18 pages)
Published By: Independent Institute
//www.jstor.org/stable/26591780
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Journal Information
The Independent Review is the acclaimed interdisciplinary journal devoted to the study of political economy and the critical analysis of government policy. The Independent Review is thoroughly researched, peer-reviewed, and based on scholarship of the highest caliber. However, unlike so many other journals, it is also provocative, lucid, and written in an engaging style. Ranging across the fields of economics, political science, law, history, philosophy, and sociology, The Independent Review boldly challenges the politicization and bureaucratization of our world, featuring in-depth examinations of past, present, and future policy issues by some of the world's leading scholars and experts.
Publisher Information
Independent Institute is a non-profit, non-partisan, public-policy research and educational organization that shapes ideas into profound and lasting impact. The mission of Independent is to boldly advance peaceful, prosperous, and free societies grounded in a commitment to human worth and dignity. Applying independent thinking to issues that matter, we create transformational ideas for today’s most pressing social and economic challenges. The results of this work are published as books, our quarterly journal, The Independent Review, and other publications and form the basis for numerous conference and media programs. By connecting these ideas with organizations and networks, we seek to inspire action that can unleash an era of unparalleled human flourishing at home and around the globe.
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journal article
Spontaneous Order and the Common Law: Gordon Tullock's CritiquePublic Choice
Vol. 135, No. 1/2, A Symposium on Tullock's Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies (Apr., 2008)
, pp. 35-53 (19 pages)
Published By: Springer
//www.jstor.org/stable/27698249
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Abstract
Gordon Tullock critiques two specific aspects of the common law system: the adversary system of dispute resolution and the common law process of rulemaking, contrasting them with the inquisitorial system and the civil law systems respectively. Tullock's general critique is straightforward: litigation under the common law system is plagued by the same rent-seeking and rent-dissipation dynamics that Tullock famously ascribed to the process of legislative rent-seeking. The article concludes that Tullock's critique of the adversary system appears to be stronger on both theoretical and empirical grounds than his critique of the common law system of rulemaking.
Journal Information
Public Choice deals with the intersection between economics and political science. The journal was founded at a time when economists and political scientists became interested in the application of essentially economic methods to problems normally dealt with by political scientists. It has always retained strong traces of economic methodology, but new and fruitful techniques have been developed which are not recognizable by economists. Public Choice therefore remains central in its chosen role of introducing the two groups to each other, and allowing them to explain themselves through the medium of its pages.
Publisher Information
Springer is one of the leading international scientific publishing companies, publishing over 1,200 journals and more than 3,000 new books annually, covering a wide range of subjects including biomedicine and the life sciences, clinical medicine, physics, engineering, mathematics, computer sciences, and economics.
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Public Choice
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