Behav Anal. 2010 Spring; 33(1): 47–63. Following from an earlier analysis by B. F. Skinner, the present article suggests that the verbal processes in science may usefully be viewed as following a three-stage progression. This progression starts with (a) identification of basic data, then moves to (b) description of relations among those
data, and ultimately concludes with (c) the deployment of higher order concepts in statements about organizations of data. The article emphasizes the importance of viewing theory and explanation as examples of verbal processes at the later stages, guided by the stimulus control from the earlier stages. The article further suggests that many theories and explanations in traditional psychology often take a form that appears to be from the later stages. However, adequate activity at the earlier
stages has not preceded those theories and explanations. They therefore do not have the benefit of suitable stimulus control from the earlier stages. Rather, they reflect some degree of stimulus control by many mentalistic assumptions about causal entities and relations. Ultimately, traditional theories and explanations influenced by mentalistic assumptions occasion less effective interaction with natural events (e.g., through prediction and control) than they might otherwise. Keywords:
nature of science, hypothetico-deductive practices, contemplative ideal, technological ideal, pragmatism, prediction and control, interpretation Some years ago, Day (1969) suggested that “Science is at heart either the behavior of scientists or the artifacts of such activity” (pp. 318–319).
Presumably, much of that behavior is verbal, and the artifacts in question are verbal products. Indeed, the common terms associated with doing science, like theorizing and explaining, imply instances of verbal behavior and verbal products. In this regard, readers may recall that chapter 18 of Skinner's (1957) landmark book Verbal Behavior is titled
“Logical and Scientific Verbal Behavior.” Accordingly, an analysis of science emphasizes an analysis of the underlying verbal processes as they have played out over time. The present article explores some implications of this position. As described elsewhere, the Austrian mathematician, physicist, and philosopher of
science Ernst Mach (1838–1916) strongly influenced Skinner's (1904–1990) intellectual development (Marr, 2003; Moore, 2005;
Moxley, 2005; Skinner, 1967, 1979;
Smith, 1986, 1995). For example, Skinner (1953) endorsed Mach's position that the first laws and
theories of a science were probably rules developed by artisans and craftsmen who worked in a given area. As these individuals interacted with nature, they developed skilled repertoires. Descriptions of the effects brought about by relevant practices were then codified in the form of verbal statements that functioned as verbal stimuli, the purpose of which was to occasion effective action, if only among subordinates. The verbal statements, often taking the form of maxims or other informal
expressions (e.g., “rules of thumb”), supplemented or replaced private or idiosyncratic forms of stimulus control. The verbal stimuli became public property, and were transmitted as part of the culture, enabling others to behave effectively. However, science progressed beyond these lower level activities to develop higher order statements and concepts. A relevant passage from Skinner's writing is as
follows: [Science] is a search for order, for uniformities, for lawful relations among the events in nature. It begins, as we all begin, by observing single episodes, but it quickly passes on to the general rule, to scientific law. … As Ernst Mach showed in tracing the history of the science of mechanics, the earliest laws of science were probably the rules used by craftsmen and artisans in training apprentices. … In a later stage science advances from the collection of rules or
laws to larger systematic arrangements. Not only does it make statements about the world, it makes statements about statements. (Skinner, 1953, pp. 13–14) Many scientific laws and theories therefore specify the relation between certain classes of responses and their consequences. In this regard, scientific laws and theories are
not statements that are obeyed by Nature. Rather, scientific laws and theories are statements that exert discriminative control over the behavior of individuals who need to deal effectively with nature. The following passage from Skinner's writings gives further evidence of the general pragmatic orientation in a radical behaviorism concerned with organizing observations and facilitating desired outcomes: Scientific laws also specify or imply responses and their
consequences. They are not, of course, obeyed by nature but by men who deal effectively with nature. The formula s = ½ gt does not govern the behavior of falling bodies, it governs those who correctly predict the position of falling bodies at given times. … As a culture produces maxims, laws, grammar, and science, its members find it easier to behave effectively without direct or prolonged contact with the contingencies of reinforcement thus formulated. … Science is in large part a direct
analysis of the reinforcing systems found in nature; it is concerned with facilitating the behavior which is reinforced by them. … The point of science … is to analyze the contingencies of reinforcement found in nature and to formulate rules or laws which make it unnecessary to be exposed to them in order to behave appropriately. (Skinner, 1969, pp. 141,
143, 166) Prediction and ControlOften science is said to be concerned with prediction and control. For example, James (1892) argued that, “All natural sciences aim at practical prediction and control” (p. 148). Subsequently, Watson (1913) argued that, “the theoretical goal [of psychology as the behaviorist views it] is the prediction and control of behavior” (p. 158). From the pragmatic perspective of a radical behaviorism, predictions about natural events are important for practical action concerning those events. Skinner (1953) commented as follows:
Prediction is important then as a guide by which to secure reinforcers from nature. When we can actually control antecedent circumstances, we can intervene or manipulate to produce desired ends. When we cannot actually control antecedent circumstances, we can nevertheless take action that results in desired ends. We obviously cannot intervene or manipulate the movement of the stars or planets, but by studying their movements we can gauge the seasons and when we can plant crops to produce a bountiful harvest. STAGES OF THEORY BUILDINGTheories are traditionally regarded as an important feature of scientific behavior. In an important article, Skinner (1947/1972) elaborated a Machian line of reasoning as he more explicitly outlined three important stages in the development of theorizing:
In light of this series, it may be useful to view the stages as modes on a continuum, rather than as discrete, nonoverlapping activities. In any case, we start by noting that scientific statements are derived from contact with events and are ultimately applicable to events. The fundamental concern with events ensures that scientific activity is anchored to human behavior. Much of science begins by analyzing events and identifying the constituent participants of events, for example, as classes of variables or factors. Once identified, the participants in events are then available for prediction and control, and for abstraction, integration, and generalization into further statements with higher order concepts that characterize how the variables and factors relate to each other in a system. With regard to a science of behavior, an example of the first stage of scientific activity is the identification of parameters of reinforcement and responding (perhaps dealt with as frequency over time or as probability) as basic independent and dependent variables. An example of the second stage is the identification of functional relations between the parameters of reinforcement and responding. An example of the third stage of scientific activity is organizing the variables, factors, and relations identified in the first and second stages into a comprehensive system. Such a system would deploy higher order concepts to yield an economical description of the facts so organized, reduced to a minimal number of terms. IS RADICAL BEHAVIORISM ATHEORETICAL?Traditional psychologists sometimes suggest that radical behaviorism is “atheoretical,” usually as a consequence of Skinner's (1950) article that rhetorically questioned the assumption that all research activity had to test theories according to the hypothetico-deductive method in order to be considered legitimate. Often the claim is that some organizing framework is necessary to properly collect and evaluate experimental data, thereby giving meaning to the process. For example, Kant held that observation is blind unless guided by theory. Similarly, Poincaré (1913) stated that,
Radical Behaviorist Replies to Claims That It Is AtheoreticalRadical behaviorists actually have at least two replies to the traditional claim that it is atheoretical. First, radical behaviorists reply that first- and second-stage activities need not be carried out by testing a theory. They can “proceed in a rather Baconian fashion” (Skinner, 1969, p. 82) by manipulating variables “selected for study through a commonsense exploration of the field” (Skinner in Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 101). Indeed, with his tongue firmly planted in his cheek, Skinner (1956) once pointed out that when they conduct research, researchers may have to heed five important principles that are not often formally recognized by scientific methodologists: (a) When you run onto something interesting, drop everything else and study it. (b) Some ways of doing research are easier than others. (c) Some people are lucky. (d) Apparatuses sometimes break down. (e) Serendipity—you may find one thing while looking for something else. In a more serious vein, we may note that it may even be wasteful to conduct research at these stages that presumes to test a theory. The appropriate foundation needs to be established before potentially useful third-stage concepts will appear and need to be evaluated. Second, Skinner studied Poincaré extensively while he was in graduate school, and was much influenced by Poincaré's writings (e.g., Skinner, 1979, pp. 66, 83). For instance, consistent with the passage above from Poincaré, Skinner (1947/1972) stated the following:
Clearly, then, a radical behaviorism has always been intimately concerned with developing a theory. It is just that, for radical behaviorism, theories come about as a result of the three-stage progression described above. Radical Behaviorism and TheoriesSkinner further described his own position on theories in the following way:
In conjunction with the points above, Skinner stated,
RecapitulationIn sum, radical behaviorists suggest that many traditional theories in psychology have not gone through anything remotely resembling a developmental process such as outlined above, three stages or otherwise. The important consideration is that verbal processes at the earlier stages establish a large degree of stimulus control over verbal processes at the later stages. At issue is whether traditional psychologists recognize that in the absence of this kind of stimulus control, their “theoretical” verbal behavior can be controlled to a large extent by mischievous factors that are cherished for irrelevant and extraneous reasons. Their verbal responses can be conformist, that is, the product of many mentalistic if not dualistic factors popular in the culture. In addition, the verbal responses can consist of many socially approved but unfortunate metaphorical extensions. The verbal responses can end up appealing to other dimensions at the first and second stages, and consequently get off track (Moore, 2008a, pp. 273–274). The result is mentalism. Because of these mentalistic influences, the stimulus control in many cases over what are hailed as advanced third-stage verbal activities is suspect. Theory testing according to a hypothetico-deductive process does not necessarily correct these problems. MORE ON THEORIZINGTheories and Cause-and-Effect RelationsAn important feature of Skinner's analysis of theories, explanations, and scientific verbal behavior is that statements of facts that identify cause-and-effect relations may well be conspicuous at the first and second stages of theory development. For example, Skinner (1964) stated “When I said ‘explanation,’ I simply meant the causal account. An explanation is the demonstration of a functional relationship between behavior and manipulable or controllable variables” (p. 102). Interestingly, Russell (1932) noted that cause-and-effect statements may turn out to be absent from certain scientific renderings: “All philosophers, of every school, imagine that causation is one of the fundamental axioms or postulates of science, yet, oddly enough, in advanced sciences such as gravitational astronomy, the word ‘cause’ never occurs” (p. 180). The seeming inconsistency between Skinner and Russell can be readily reconciled by recognizing that the terms cause and effect are typically absorbed into higher order third-stage statements taken as theories through the verbal processes inherent in their development. Thus, causal analysis lies at the heart of science, although the final statements in a theory may not have the form of cause and effect (Moore, 2000). A parallel with other sciences may be informative. Chemistry identified basic data, such as those associated with the various elements in compounds, using the methods of the natural sciences. This activity was at the first stage. Then basic relations were studied, such as what amounts of elements were in the compound and how much energy might be required to cause the compounds. This activity was at the second stage. Then statements about organizations of data were made. A periodic table of the elements was developed, with protons and neutrons in the nucleus of an atom of the element, electrons in shells defined by various energy levels, and so on. This activity was at the third stage. Theories, Systems, and Reinforcers for Higher Order Scientific ActivityReaders may recall that chapter 1 in Skinner's (1938) The Behavior of Organisms is titled “A System of Behavior.” In it Skinner said “I am interested, first, in setting up a system of behavior in terms of which the facts of a science may be stated and, second, in testing the system experimentally at some of its more important points” (p. 5). Thus, Skinner began to follow the three-stage progression early in his own research career. Behavioral data such as rate or probability of responding were identified at Stage 1, rather than introspective statements about mental life. The effects of various manipulations and operations on responding were investigated and formulated in the second stage. Skinner (1938, pp. 12 ff.) further talked about second-stage activities in a discussion of static and dynamic laws of the reflex, following from Sherrington (1906) and to some extent Pavlov. At the third stage, the data and relations were brought together and applied to larger contexts. An example of advanced third-stage activity is much of the latter half of Skinner (1953), as well as Skinner (1969). In one volume of his autobiography, Skinner (1979) reviewed his own scientific behavior from the point of view of contingencies:
Here, Skinner was presumably reflecting on the reinforcers for third-stage activity, for bringing together the data in a meaningful and systematic way, just as in Poincaré (1913) and Skinner (1947/1972). Theories and MentalismAs alluded to above, Skinner's statements about theories and explanations that appeal to causal processes in “different dimensions” (e.g., in the real nervous system, a conceptual nervous system, or the mind) are concerned with mentalism. More specifically, mentalism is the appeal to acts, states, mechanisms, processes, entities, structures, and the like, assumed to be from a dimensional system that differs from the one in which behavior takes place, as causally effective antecedents in an explanation of behavior. Radical behaviorism is concerned about the dimensions of theories and explanations when they include elements that are not expressed in the same terms and cannot be confirmed with the same methods of observation and analysis as the facts they are said to address (e.g., Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 88). For example, the theory or explanation might be couched in metaphors like “information processing,” or buckets that fill up but then leak, or springs that wind up but then unwind, or even supposed neural or physiological properties that have never been observed but are “inferred” from behavior. Similarly, the everyday language of folk psychology, which attributes existential, explanatory status to wishes, wants, desires, and intentions as mental things different from behavioral things, is mentalism. In short, Skinner's definition raises concerns about theories and explanations that appeal to “internal” or “inner” causes and dimensions. One common sense of internal in traditional psychology, perhaps even one of its defining characteristics, is that of the mental or cognitive. Radical behaviorism is concerned about talk of mental causes and dimensions because such talk is a product of nonscientific influences. Some examples of these influences are (a) common linguistic practices of converting adjectives and adverbs into nouns (reification, recognizing of course that words can neither literally create nor change the nature of the things talked about); (b) unfortunate and ultimately mischievous metaphors; and (c) outright dualistic assumptions. Concerns with supposed mental causes ultimately divert more effective analyses in terms of causal relations in the one dimension in which behavior takes place. As Skinner (1938) put it in a very early discussion, his view was that at that time, a science of behavior
Skinner saw his project as redefining psychology as the science of behavior, in which behavior was taken as a subject matter in its own right, as Watson (1878–1958) had earlier envisioned it. Skinner chafed at the delays in getting there, even later in his career:
Often theories are the vehicle that perpetuates mentalism. Mentalistic theories superficially have the form of a third-stage verbal product, but have not gone through developmental verbal processes associated with the first two stages. As a result, mentalistic and cognitive theories are likely to be concerned with spurious data and relations and do not effectively occasion prediction and control. Indeed, Skinner put it even more strongly: “Cognitive science is the creation science of psychology, as it struggles to maintain the position of a mind or self” (Skinner, 1990, p. 1209), and “I think cognitive psychology is a great hoax and a fraud, and that goes for brain science, too” (Skinner in Goleman, 1987, p. Y18). QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF OPERANT CHOICE BEHAVIORThe Generalized Matching LawOne prominent feature of contemporary research in the experimental analysis of behavior is a quantitative treatment known as the generalized matching law (GML; e.g., Baum, 1974, 1979). An important element of the GML is the exponent a, a parameter estimated after the fact in a data set that is said to describe sensitivity to reinforcement in the experimental setting. If a value of 1.0 for a yields the best description of the observed data, we say strict matching has occurred, but other values of a have been observed. Indeed, Davison and McCarthy (1988) suggested that the value of a that best describes the observed data in many studies actually tends to be less than 1.0, often close to .80. Moore (2008b) has recently called attention to the resemblance between the exponent a in the GML and the exponent n in Stevens's (1957) psychophysical law, said to describe sensitivity to stimuli in the modality being examined. Stevens, of course, was an influential member of the Harvard Psychology Department when much of the research and discussion related to what would eventually become the GML were taking place. According to Grace (1996), “it should be emphasized that … the generalized matching law … is fundamentally a descriptive, molar model. Its fitted parameters provide a set of higher order dependent variables to guide research” (p. 376). Thus, the GML is not a causal law that specifies what caused some observed relation between independent and dependent variables. Rather, it uses free parameters to describe an observed relation between obtained reinforcement and responding in one or more already existing sets of data. Prediction, Control, and the GMLWhat then about prediction and control? Ordinarily, we predict a dependent variable on the basis of a priori knowledge of an independent variable. In simple terms, we predict an effect from a cause. Predictions generated from the GML are not of this sort. To predict is to engage in verbal behavior under the control of some discriminative stimulus. The discriminative stimulus for the verbal product called the GML is explicitly identified as obtained reinforcement, not scheduled reinforcement. Thus, because the data have already been observed, and because the GML uses obtained rather than scheduled reinforcement frequency, there is no a priori independent variable in the ordinary sense of prediction. The effect has already happened, so there is no need to predict it. Thus, the GML can be contrasted with Skinner's (1953, pp. 13–14) passage cited earlier in this article, in which he emphasized the practical value of predicting—to prepare for some future state of affairs. To be sure, we can predict that the data can be fit post hoc to the basic form of the equation, given such free parameters as a for sensitivity that are estimated post hoc to secure a suitable fit. Similarly, we can predict the data by assuming that scheduled reinforcement frequency will be close to that obtained, which it often is, even though the GML is explicitly phrased in terms of obtained reinforcement. Is the GML a Third-Stage Activity?To use Skinner's framework, is it then possible to construe the GML as a third-stage activity (see Moore, 2008b, for discussion of this point)? For example, Killeen (1972) stated that “Viewed as a defining relation, matching deserves the label of ‘law’ just as does the defining relation between voltage, resistance, and current that we speak of as Ohm's law” (p. 492). Clearly, Ohm's law would be a third-stage activity. For present purposes, it is important to return to the point that third-stage statements come at the end of a developmental process that includes earlier cause-and-effect statements (e.g., in Stage 2), as Skinner described in his three-stages argument. At issue is whether comparable cause-and-effect statements have been forthcoming in much of the quantitative literature. The closest seems to be melioration (Herrnstein, 1997). Whereas others spoke of momentary maximizing, which would be a cause-and-effect principle, Herrnstein (pp. 68 ff.) disparaged it. Causal Explanation, Mediation, and the GMLTo be sure, one benefit of the GML is to show that behavior is ultimately an orderly subject matter that can be given a quantitative analysis, much as can be other subject matters in other sciences. Nevertheless, Moore (2008b) expressed concern that the GML is a form of explanation by instantiation, and thereby regresses into essentialism, as in Stevens's (1957) psychophysical law. The psychophysical law is based on assumptions of an S-O-R mediational model: A public, objective stimulus that can be agreed on is taken to produce a private, subjective sensation, which in turn is taken to produce public, objective behavior that can be agreed on, such as a verbal report ostensibly about the strength of the sensation. The inferred, subjective sensation is assumed to be the critical causal variable, because subjects are never directly in contact with the environment but only with the mediating organismic variable. However, it is private and cannot be part of the body of science if only because it cannot be agreed on. The experimental operations of the discrimination procedure and the accompanying mathematics are taken to produce agreement about the nature of the inferred, subjective sensation, thereby making the whole enterprise scientifically legitimate. According to Skinner (1969), “S. S. Stevens has applied Bridgman's principle [of operationism] to psychology, not to decide whether subjective events exist, but to determine the extent to which we can deal with them scientifically” (p. 227). By substituting just a few terms for the different context, we can now say many of the same things about the GML and the extent to which it ultimately subscribes to an S-O-R mediational model. A public, objective variable like reinforcement that can be agreed on is taken to produce private, subjective “value,” which in turn is taken to produce public, objective behavior that can be agreed on, such as the distribution of responding on a concurrent schedule. The inferred, subjective value is assumed to be the critical causal variable, because subjects are never directly in contact with the environment but only with the mediating organismic variable of subjective value. The experimental operations of the concurrent-schedules procedure and the accompanying mathematics are taken to produce agreement about the nature of inferred, subjective value, thereby making the whole enterprise scientifically legitimate. For both the psychophysical law and the GML, then, the mathematics are presumed to reflect the essential characteristics of the underlying subjective processes, which cannot be talked about directly because they are not publicly observable. Some passages from the literature of the operant quantitative analysis of behavior reflect the commitment to the mediational model:
Of attendant concern is whether greater attention to causal processes would go a long way toward clarifying the value of activity in the quantitative analysis of behavior. The pragmatic spirit of Bacon and Mach calls for greater interest in direct contact with a subject matter than in words. In this regard, Ferster's (1978) comments in a review of Honig and Staddon's (1977) Handbook of Operant Behavior may well apply to the contemporary status of the quantitative analysis of behavior:
By way of contrast with Ferster, we note that researchers and theorists with interests in the quantitative analysis of behavior have often reported that they are more concerned with how to manipulate data than with behavior itself: “It would be well, therefore, to focus future investigations on the manipulations necessary to confirm the law, rather than on whether the law is true” (Rachlin, 1971, p. 251). CONTEMPLATIVE VERSUS TECHNOLOGICAL IDEALS OF SCIENCEThe Influence of Francis BaconIn a provocative article, Smith (1992) reviewed the influence of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) on scientific pragmatism and offered the following analysis, the pragmatic themes of which accord comfortably with a behavior-analytic approach to science reviewed above:
Contemplative versus Technological Ideals of ScienceSmith (1992) further noted that many historians and philosophers of science distinguish between two broad ideal types of science. The first is the contemplative ideal. Smith traced this point of view back to Aristotle. It seeks to “understand” events in the “natural world” and their causes. Its methods are based largely on passive observation. It emphasizes classification of natural phenomena and systematic description. It further argues that a full understanding of nature is attainable only through “theoretical” knowledge. The second is the technological ideal. Smith (1992) traced this point of view back to Bacon, and perhaps also Mach. The technological ideal is predicated on practical, productive knowledge—how to control, make, and remake the world. Its methods are grounded in active experimentation, emphasizing hands-on manipulation of natural materials as well as experimental variables. Intervention in the course of nature is held to be especially revealing of natural processes, and the reformist bent implicit in the technological ideal has had a strong appeal in American culture. Nevertheless, those inclined toward the contemplative ideal regard the technological ideal as inferior because it involved merely imitations of nature that could never fully reproduce the effects of nature, much less supersede them. Behaviorism and the Technological IdealSmith (1992) noted that at a general level, American behaviorism was consistent with the technological ideal. It was interventionist with a vengeance. An early figure in the history of American psychology that could be identified with this ideal is Jacques Loeb (1859–1924), who was a prominent faculty member at the University of Chicago during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Loeb talked often of the engineering ideal in connection with human behavior, and Watson was one of the students at Chicago during Loeb's time there. Clearly the writings of Watson (e.g., those related to child raising) align well with the technological ideal. The technological ideal flourished in many Western countries during the 19th and 20th centuries, and clearly contributed much to society in those countries, as standards of living, education, and health care improved on average. Of course, there were also longer term consequences, as measured in the degradation of the environment and alienation of workers. Smith (1992) reports that despite its benefits, the technological ideal has fallen from favor in recent years. Perhaps its decline is due to the excesses of the Protestant ethic and free-enterprise capitalism, or even postmodernism. Some sectors of society have often taken the stance that just because they can do something, they are entitled to do so. For example, if they have the technical capacity to use previously untrained workers to extract nonrenewable resources from the ground for the purpose of using other untrained workers to manufacture commercial goods, they should be allowed to do in the near term whatever is not expressly prohibited by law, regardless of longer term consequences. As a canonical representative of 20th century American behaviorism, Skinner embraced the technological ideal in many respects. His approach to psychology was heavily influenced by Bacon and Mach (Moore, 2005). Readers may recall that previously in this article, we cited Skinner's (1953) argument that “Science is not concerned with contemplation” (p. 14). That Skinner should be tarred with the brush of technological excesses is not clear, however. From his early days, Skinner was strongly influenced by modernist trends of social melioration. He read much of Watson, for example, concerning child raising. From Bacon and Mach, he learned the value of controlling nature so that desired ends are realized, lest nature bring about undesired and unfortunate ends. His utopian novel Walden Two (1948) clearly showed the influence of Bacon. However, few if any technological excesses exist in Walden Two. To the contrary, cultural practices and daily life in Walden Two were deliberately structured to bring citizens into contact with their long-term consequences. Small is beautiful, but not because smallness promotes a desirable homogeneity. Rather, smallness facilitates direct contact with contingencies that underlie practices in daily life that contribute to the long-term survival of the culture (Skinner, 1987). The Contemplative Ideal and the GMLInterestingly, Smith (1992) pointed out that some of the current activity in the quantitative analysis of operant choice behavior borders on the contemplative rather than technological:
In partial recognition of Smith's argument, Moore's (2008b) recent analysis of the literature associated with the GML stressed that the importance of third-stage processes is that the resulting verbal products readily occasion practical, effective action in the form of prediction and control. It appears that in the absence of further assumptions, such as assuming scheduled reinforcement will approximate that obtained, the a priori predictive and practical value of the GML as it is currently formulated is limited. From the point of view of the present treatment, it is questionable to assume that we can arrive at the third stage without an adequate foundation in the first and second. In a larger sense, it is further questionable to assume that there actually is a cognitive or contemplative basis for a theory that differs from the end point of the effectiveness achieved by a technological basis. To view a theory as having a cognitive, contemplative basis apart from a technological basis is to actually assume that there is some metaphysical, essentialist, or Platonic order into which science taps at the third stage. Such an assumption constitutes mentalism. INVESTIGATIVE METHODS IN SCIENCEWhy Do Scientists Do Science?Moore (2008a, pp. 240 ff.) recently addressed the question of why scientists do science. His answer pointed out that for radical behaviorists, doing science is operant behavior. It is occasioned by particular antecedent circumstances, and it is maintained by particular outcomes. Moore then went on to cite Sidman (1960) regarding several of the antecedent circumstances that occasion scientific research: Scientists may want (a) to evaluate hypotheses, (b) to indulge their curiosity about nature, (c) to try out a new method or technique, (d) to establish the existence of a phenomenon, or (e) to explore the conditions under which a phenomenon occurs. The artifacts of research activity, such as scientific statements, are then available to guide the behavior of others with similar concerns. To be sure, some science is done to critically examine hypotheses, but not all is or even needs to be. As Skinner (1974) once put it, “The behavior of the scientist is often reconstructed by scientific methodologists within a logical framework of hypothesis, deduction, and the testing of theorems, but the reconstruction seldom represents the behavior of the scientist at work” (p. 343). Thus, the specific circumstances that cause scientists to do science in any given case are always going to be empirical matters. Moore (2008a) then summarized the goals of a science of behavior according to radical behaviorism as follows (see also Catania & Harnad, 1988, p. 104):
These goals highlight that research is one way for experimenters to come under the control of variables and relations that participate in an event. By so doing, experimenters may better formulate and refine principles that inform the prediction and control of behavioral events. Research methods in a science are designed to promote effective scientific statements. They suggest manipulations that isolate the actions of relevant variables, so that their participation in events can be effectively understood (Johnston & Pennypacker, 1993; Sidman, 1960). By so doing, researchers are following Poincaré's (1913) earlier suggestion regarding experimentation. It is the bringing together of the data in a way that identifies how relations among behavior and its controlling variables may be effectively studied that constitutes an important aspect of third-stage activity. Perhaps the notion that even un-self-consciously mentalistic theories in traditional psychology make a heuristic contribution hints at this aspect of science. Covering Law Model of ExplanationA traditionally important mode of explanation involves deductions from a “covering law” and entails the hypothetico-deductive method (Hempel & Oppenheim, 1948). According to this kind of explanation, an event is said to be explained when its description follows as a valid deduction in a logical argument in which at least one of the premises is a covering law and at least one of the other premises (if there is more than one other premise) is a statement of observed, factually specified antecedent conditions. Covering law explanations presumably get their name because the law “covers” the event to be explained, by subsuming the event under (e.g., as a logical consequence of) the law and antecedent conditions. In other words, a researcher or theorist elaborates an implication (i.e., a deduction) from a hypothesized covering law, or at least a law-like generalization, and a statement of prevailing conditions. If the implication or deduction is supported by experimental data, then the law is presumed to be valid in some sense, and the status of the hypothesis is changed to a law. Interestingly, Schoenfeld (1969) commented incisively on this very practice some years ago:
InterpretationA final important aspect of scientific activity on which we may touch is interpretation. Interpretation is the use of scientific terms and principles in talking about facts when too little is known to make prediction and control possible or when precise manipulation of antecedent circumstances is not feasible (Moore, 1998, p. 231). Two examples of interpretation are (a) the theory of evolution and (b) the theory of plate tectonics. These theories are interpretations of a vast number of facts, in one case about the origin of species and in the other about the nature of the earth's crust. They incorporate terms and principles taken from much more accessible material and from experimental analyses and their technological applications. The selectionist principles of variation, interaction with environment, and replication can be studied in the laboratory under controlled conditions, but their role in explanations of the evolution of species is interpretation. Similarly, the basic principles that govern the behavior of material under high pressure and high temperature can be studied in the laboratory under controlled conditions, but their role in explanations of the formation of surface features of the earth is interpretation (e.g., Skinner in Catania & Harnad, 1988, pp. 207–208). Interpretation typically comes into play at the second and third stages of scientific activity. At these stages, there is again Poincaré's generalization from previously investigated to new cases, based on similar principles. In a sense, interpretation recapitulates Lyell's (1830) concept of uniformitarianism, which suggests that principles (e.g., of geology) that currently operate and are used to explain certain current phenomena presumably operated in the past and can be used to explain past phenomena. In other words, we assume that physical processes are uniform across time and place. In interpretation we assume that known principles can be applied to current situations, even though we have not performed an experimental analysis to demonstrate that they in fact do. In other words, we assume that behavioral processes are uniform across time and place. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONSProbably most researchers and theorists would maintain that their scientific statements are best regarded as useful descriptions of their observations of and interactions with nature rather than as metaphysical pronouncements about an ultimate reality. If so, then such statements presumably follow some pattern of development. The present article has laid out some possibilities for understanding one such pattern. The article has further contrasted statements related to this pattern with statements that are derived from mentalistic assumptions and are ultimately less effective. In marked contrast to traditional views that are concerned with internal coherence of models or correspondence with mechanistic accounts, behavior analysis is robustly pragmatic. The value of its statements is measured by the extent to which they promote practical, effective action. In the final analysis, the question is what can we do to secure a better outcome of an event, by virtue of the statements we derive from doing research? In what ways do our statements facilitate interventions or manipulations that produce more reinforcing states of affairs? We surely do have physiological mechanisms inside our skin, and knowledge of these mechanisms can quite reasonably inform efforts to predict and control behavior. However, this sort of knowledge will come from direct investigation, rather than metaphorical inferences about acts, states, processes, structures, or entities supposedly in other dimensions. The mentalism of traditional views ultimately limits practical, effective action, by virtue of their concerns with other dimensions. FootnotesThe present article draws on themes in other work by the author, and includes revised portions of that work. REFERENCES
Articles from The Behavior Analyst are provided here courtesy of Association for Behavior Analysis International What propose reasons for relationships among events and allow us to derive explanations and predictions?theory. A theory proposes a relationship among multiple observed events.
Which psychologist proposed that much of our life is governed by unconscious ideas and impulses that originate in childhood conflicts?Freud's theory of psychoanalysis assumes that much of mental life is unconscious, and that past experiences, especially in early childhood, shape how a person feels and behaves throughout life.
Which method allows psychologists and other scientists to observe behavior where it happens or in the field?Psychologists use the scientific method to observe behaviors as they occur in everyday life and in situations researchers are interested in learning about.
What is the name for a source of bias that may occur in research findings when participants are allowed to choose for themselves a certain treatment in a scientific study?Selection bias is a kind of error that occurs when the researcher decides who is going to be studied. It is usually associated with research where the selection of participants isn't random (i.e. with observational studies such as cohort, case-control and cross-sectional studies).
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